This study of the Byzantine philosopher George Gemistos Plethon includes the first complete translation of his treatise, On the Differences of Aristotle from Plato, and summarizes all his other works. Woodhouse emphasizes Plethon's controversy with George Scholarios on the respective merits of Plato and Aristotle and his important impact on the Italian humanists during the Council of Union at Ferrara and Florence in 1438-9. Though Plethon's ambition to create a new religion based on Neoplatonism was never realized, his ideas (...) had a significant influence on the western Renaissance. (shrink)

W. V. Quine famously defended two theses that have fallen rather dramatically out of fashion. The first is that intensions are “creatures of darkness” that ultimately have no place in respectable philosophical circles, owing primarily to their lack of rigorous identity conditions. However, although he was thoroughly familiar with Carnap’s foundational studies in what would become known as possible world semantics, it likely wouldn’t yet have been apparent to Quine that he was fighting a losing battle against intensions, due in (...) large measure to developments stemming from Carnap’s studies and culminating in the work of Kripke, Hintikka, and Bayart. These developments undermined Quine’s crusade against intensions on two fronts. First, in the context of possible world semantics, intensions could after all be given rigorous identity conditions by defining them (in the simplest case) as functions from worlds to appropriate extensions, a fact exploited to powerful and influential effect in logic and linguistics by the likes of Kaplan, Montague, Lewis, and Cresswell. Second, the rise of possible world semantics fueled a strong resurgence of metaphysics in contemporary analytic philosophy that saw properties and propositions widely, fruitfully, and unabashedly adopted as ontological primitives in their own right. This resurgence — happily, in my view — continues into the present day. -/- For a time, at any rate, Quine experienced somewhat better success with his second thesis: that higher-order logic is, at worst, confused and, at best, a quirky notational alternative to standard first-order logic. However, Quine notwithstanding, a great deal of recent work in formal metaphysics transpires in a higher-order logical framework in which properties and propositions fall into an infinite hierarchy of types of (at least) every finite order. Initially, the most philosophically compelling reason for embracing such a framework since Russell first proposed his simple theory of types was simply that it provides a relatively natural explanation of the paradoxes. However, since the seminal work of Prior there has been a growing trend to consider higher-order logic to be the most philosophically natural framework for metaphysical inquiry, many of the contributors to this volume being among the most important and influential advocates of this view. Indeed, this is now quite arguably the dominant view among formal metaphysicians. -/- In this paper, and against the current tide, I will argue in §1 that there are still good reasons to think that Quine’s second battle is not yet lost and that the correct framework for logic is first-order and type-free — properties and propositions, logically speaking, are just individuals among others in a single domain of quantification — and that it arises naturally out of our most basic logical and semantical intuitions. The data I will draw upon are not new and are well-known to contemporary higher-order metaphysicians. However, I will try to defend my thesis in what I believe is a novel way by suggesting that these basic intuitions ground a reasonable distinction between “pure” logic and non-logical theory, and that Russell-style semantic paradoxes of truth and exemplification arise only when we move beyond the purely logical and, hence, do not of themselves provide any strong objection to a type-free conception of properties and propositions. -/- Most of my arguments in §1 are largely independent of any specific account of the nature of properties and propositions beyond their type-freedom. However, I will in addition argue that there are good reasons to take propositions, at least, to be very fine-grained. My arguments are thus bolstered significantly if it can be shown that there are in fact well-defined examples of logics that are not only type-free but which comport with such a conception of propositions. It is the purpose of §2 to lay out a logic of this sort in some detail, drawing especially upon work by George Bealer and related work of my own. With the logic in place, it will be possible to generalize the line of argument noted above regarding Russell-style paradoxes and, in §3, apply it to two propositional paradoxes — the Prior-Kaplan paradox and the Russell-Myhill paradox — that are often taken to threaten the sort of account developed here. (shrink)

'A clear, readable and fair account of the development of judicial review.'-Ashley Montagu.

In an age where issues like climate change and the unintended consequences of technological innovation are high on the ethical and political agenda, questions about the nature and extent of our responsibilities to future generations have never been more important, yet simultaneously so difficult to answer. This book takes a unique approach to the problem by drawing on diverse traditions of thinking about care (including developmental psychology, phenomenology and feminist ethics) to explore the nature and meaning of our relationship with (...) the future. Demonstrating that many influential perspectives on intergenerational ethics, including positions advanced by John Rawls, Brian Barry, and Ulrich Beck are undermined by problems relating to uncertainty, it shows that an approach based on care ethics can confront the uncertain future successfully and give a viable account of the nature and scope of future-oriented responsibilities. (shrink)

Fiction and truth : ancient stories about Pythagoras -- In search of the historical Pythagoras -- The Pythagorean secret society -- Thinkers influenced by Pythagoras and his pupils.

Suppose we believe that God created the world. Then surely we want it to be the case that he intended, in some sense at least, to create THIS world. Moreover, most theists want to hold that God didn't just guess or hope that the world would take one course or another; rather, he KNEW precisely what was going to take place in the world he planned to create. In particular, of each person P, God knew that P was to exist. (...) Call this the "standard" conception. Most theists find the standard conception appealing. Unfortunately, the view seems to conflict with the equally appealing idea — call it "temporal actualism" — that there are no "future" individuals beyond those that already exist in the present moment. For, on this view, for any historical person P, prior to creation, there was no such person as P and hence nothing about P for God to know. Hence, in particular, God couldn't have known that P was to exist. This is of course not a new problem. But past solutions to it are highly problematic. In this paper, after canvassing previous approaches, I will propose a solution that seems to preserve both temporal actualism and a suitably robust form of the standard conception while avoiding the pitfalls of the past. (shrink)

Does thought have distinctive experiential features? Is there, in addition to sensory phenomenology, a kind of cognitive phenomenology--phenomenology of a cognitive or conceptual character? Leading philosophers of mind debate whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology and whether it is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.

This paper focuses on Aquinas’s doctrine of individuation as it applies to human beings. There are three main sections. In the first, the general lines of Aquinas’s doctrine of individuation are presented in the context of discussing an article by Joseph Owens and some other recent work on individuation. I argue for form as the primary principle of individuation and specify the uniqueness of human individuality by reference to the degrees of perfection among things. The second section focuses on three (...) ways in which a meditation on our form—the rational soul—is fruitful for understanding what makes us individuals. Here I consider, in turn, the three distinctive activities of human reason—theoretical, moral, and aesthetic. Each activity is presented as it relates to three levels of perfection in the human being. In the third section, I bring up three pertinent objections to my thesis and suggest answers to them. (shrink)

Are there circumstances under which scientists and engineers doing their ordinary jobs can be thought of as participants in a social movement? The technoscientists analyzed in this article are at the forefront of a new way of doing chemistry; they are attempting to redesign chemical products and synthesis pathways to significantly reduce health effects and environmental damage from industrial chemicals. Green chemistry practitioners and entrepreneurs now constitute a small minority of chemists and chemical engineers in the university, government, and corporate (...) sectors, but the innovators gradually are institutionalizing their efforts and winning converts. Drawing on concepts from social movement theory, the authors argue that examining green chemistry as a social movement sheds light on the intentional social organization of emerging scientific and engineering disciplines, advances thinking about the role of expertise in social change, and uncovers a possible pathway toward reconstructing chemical technologies on a more environmentally sustainable basis. The article closes with questions about potential coalitions among green chemists and engineers, regulators, and activist sectors of civil society. (shrink)

This article discusses the specific ethical dilemma of obtaining informed consent and ensuring confidentiality and participant well-being while conducting a qualitative research study with novice ESL teachers in a Teacher Study Group. The discussion outlines their process of resolution of the ambiguities inherent in the research process – in essence the researchers’ personal journey of discovery. The article concludes with the broader implications for making the research process more transparent for other academic researchers working in the field of language-teacher cognition.

In American philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century there was small interest in Empiricism and almost no interest in Realism.

A case is presented in which the therapeutic interests of the patient conflict with the safety of a community, and in which the surrogate decision maker has very limited knowledge of or concern for the patient’s preferences. The substituted judgment and best interest (or rational patient) standards for surrogate decision making are problematic in this case. It is argued that the interests of even those outside the family ought to be taken seriously when making decisions about such cases, and it (...) is proposed that clinical ethics committees could play a new role here. This case also illustrates the difficulties of making decisions regarding the treatment of a very unlikable patient. (shrink)

Moral error theories are often rejected by appeal to ‘companions in guilt’ arguments. The most popular form of companions in guilt argument takes epistemic reasons for belief as a ‘companion’ and proceeds by analogy. I show that this strategy fails. I claim that the companions in guilt theorist must understand epistemic reasons as evidential support relations if her argument is to be dialectically effective. I then present a dilemma. Either epistemic reasons are evidential support relations or they are not. If (...) they are not, then the companions in guilt argument fails. If they are, then a reduction of epistemic reasons to evidential support relations becomes available and, consequently, epistemic reasons cease to be a viable ‘companion’ for moral reasons. I recommend this structure of argument over existing strategies within the literature and defend my claims against recent objections from companions in guilt theorists. (shrink)

Freedom, Philosophy, and Faith: The Transformational Role of Freedom in the Thought of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas highlights the essential role freedom plays in the Catholic intellectual tradition. Montague Brown argues that that freedom, taken in its most essential form as understood by the Judeo-Christian tradition, has been transformative in all aspects of human thought, from metaphysics to politics.

The intellectual climate in which Aquinas matured was one of conflict. On the one hand, he inherited a philosophical tradition from the Greeks which held that "nothing comes from nothing." On the other, a strong theological tradition held that, since the world was created from nothing, it tends toward nothing and will, in fact, finally return to nothing. ;Aquinas counters that both traditions are mistaken in considering all making as change. Besides the making that is of this particular thing, besides (...) even the universal cause or causes of all generation, there is a more radical making which is of the totality of being. This doctrine we find implicit in the Five Ways, essentially established in the doctrine of essence and existence, and openly explicit in Aquinas's discussions of creation itself. ;That the universe is necessary in itself is no less firmly held by Aquinas. There are two kinds of being that are incorruptible: those whose form completely dominates their matter, and those whose form exists without matter. In addition, the universe of material things itself cannot be corrupted since it has no substratum which could underlie the change. Only by misconceiving the act of creation as change does it make sense to speak of a tendency or possibility to corruption in the created universe. ;The upshot of the marriage of these two positions is that the universe is at once absolutely necessary in itself and totally dependent for its existence on God. Rather than proving to be antagonists, these two positions are actually mutually supportive. Studying the natural world for its own sake reveals the power and perfection of its Creator. Since the world depends on a cause unexplained by the order within it, there is no limit to its ultimate intelligibility, nor, therefore, to the scientific quest. Endless awe at the Creator of such a universe, and an endless field of enquiry--these are the results of Aquinas's option for both and rather than either a created world or the integral, permanent world which science investigates. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that over the last 40 years the context of agronomic research in the developing world has changed significantly. Three main changes are identified: the neoliberal turn in economic and social policy and the rise to prominence of the participation and environmental agendas. These changes have opened up new spaces for contestation around the goals, priorities, methods, results and recommendations of agronomic research. We suggest that this dynamic of contestation is having important effects on how agronomic (...) research is planned, managed, implemented, evaluated and used, and is therefore worthy of detailed study. This is particularly so at a time when food security, rising food prices and the potential impacts of climate change on agriculture are in the policy spotlight. We outline a research agenda that should help illuminate the drivers, dynamics and impacts of this new ‘political agronomy’. (shrink)

The author argues that the proper use of analogy opens up reason to revelation. Drawing on ancient and medieval sources (Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Aquinas), he discusses the transcendental properties of being (unity, truth, goodness, and beauty) and their analogous application.

This concise introduction examines a wide range of ethical positions, including relativism, emotivism, egoism, utilitarianism, Kantian formalism, & natural law.

A study of reason, as an invitation to explore and discover a new life of meaning, The Romance of Reason is an attempt to put the philosophical basis of Aquinas' thinking into nontechnical language and make it accessible to the general reader.

Despite being an aristocrat and a woman, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu made herself a writer. Hard-hitting, eloquent, and often funny, this is a revised edition of her non-epistolary writings.